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Misﬁ nancing global health: a case for transparency in 
disbursements and decision making
Devi Sridhar, Rajaie Batniji
To address the gap between health investments and ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows worldwide, we identiﬁ ed the patterns in allocation 
of funds by the four largest donors—ie, the World Bank, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), the US 
Government, and the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria—in 2005. We created a disbursement 
database with information gathered from the annual reports and budgets. Funding per death varied widely according 
to type of disease—eg, US$1029·10 for HIV/AIDS to $3·21 for non-communicable diseases. The World Bank, US 
Government, and Global Fund provided more than 98% of their funds to service delivery, whereas BMGF gave most 
of its funds to research. BMGF grants in 2005 were given largely to private research organisations, universities, and 
civil societies in rich countries, whereas the US Government and Global Fund primarily disbursed grants to 
sub-Saharan Africa. Publicly available data for global health disbursements is incomplete and not standardised. 
Continued attention is needed to develop country ownership, particularly in planning and priority setting.
Introduction
An unprecedented amount of money is being pledged and 
used to fund health research and services throughout the 
world. Although estimates are diﬃ  cult to obtain, the 2004 
estimate for international health funding was about 
US$14 billion, and is rapidly increasing, largely because of 
the emergence and growth of the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF) and the US Government’s AIDS 
initiative.1 In parallel with increased ﬁ nancial commitment, 
the consensus for technical strategies for global health is 
increasing,2 an emerging though controversial, epi-
demiological evidence-base might provide information 
about the disbursement of the health funds.3 Clariﬁ cation 
of technical and social strategies for disease prevention 
and treatment, though perhaps ﬂ awed, can facilitate 
cooperation and political commitment.
The absence of knowledge about the present investments 
by the major donors to global health might hinder 
cooperation among developing countries and international 
donors. The focus of previous eﬀ orts has been on tracking 
funding according to disease (eg, HIV/AIDS), strategic 
approach (eg, eradication vs control), country (eg, 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD] and Development Assistance Committee), and 
within country (eg, national health accounts).4–11 The OECD 
creditor reporting system provides information about the 
individual aid activities of 23 member countries and several 
UN and multilateral agencies.4,8 However, this database 
does not contain information about the activities of the 
BMGF or detailed information about grants disbursed (eg, 
primary recipient of funds).12 As noted in the reports by the 
Center for Global Development and Research and 
Development (RAND), no information source exists to 
provide an overall idea of health resource ﬂ ows, leading to 
an absence of credible estimates of donor commitments 
and actual funds.13,14 No systematic eﬀ ort has been made to 
track all disbursements from the major global health 
donors because of the diﬃ  culties.14 In this paper we use the 
few available sources to analyse health disbursements with 
the aim of prompting further disclosure of resource ﬂ ows 
from major global institutions.  We assess the discrepancy 
between what needs to be done, according to public-health 
evidence, and the ﬁ nancial commitments by considering 
all disbursements made in 2005 by the major donors 
relative to the burden of disease. We create a baseline from 
which we can assess deviations in priority that might be 
due to other inﬂ uences on the major donors by relating 
disbursements to mortality and burden of disease.
Global health donors
Although some consensus has been reached about what 
needs to be done for health, questions that remain are 
who is going to do what and how. Of the many diﬀ erent 
possible candidates (eg, governments, non-governmental 
organisations, and WHO), four institutions have come to 
the fore as donors—ie, the World Bank, US Government, 
BMGF, and Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (panel). These donors play the largest part in 
terms of ﬁ nancial contributions but they are estimated to 
contribute only about a third of all donor funding for 
global health.4 
All donors are estimated to account for about 0·3% of 
total expenditures on global health, 1·3% in non-OECD 
countries, and 6·5% in sub-Saharan Africa.14 Data for 
national health ﬁ nancing in developing countries is 
inadequate; individuals in the poorest countries often 
pay about 50% of health-care costs, and sometimes up 
to 80%, with private funds.14,15 The four donors account 
for about 0·1% of all health expenditures worldwide. 
Why is their eﬀ ect so important? Many health ministries 
have become donor dependent, with ministers from 
Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda reporting that 40–60% of 
their budgets come from donors.16 Because of this 
dependence, the priorities and services established by 
national governments, even those working with private 
funds, could be aﬀ ected by the donor’s priorities. 
The speciﬁ c mandate, capacity, and decision-making 
mechanisms of each donor can aﬀ ect the funding 
priorities; thus of importance is to understand the 
structures of each institution (webappendix). The World 
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Bank is governed by an executive board in which all 
member states are formally but not equally represented—
ie, large donor countries have more voting power.17 
Similarly, an independent board is responsible for the 
overall governance of the Global Fund, including the 
approval of disbursements. The Global Fund is unique 
because it has a board that includes substantial 
developing-country and private-sector representation.18 
The US Government undertakes initiatives that are 
supervised by the state department, which is ultimately 
responsible to the President of the USA and US Congress. 
The BMGF, a private initiative, has four co-chairs who 
oversee operations. Although the co-chairs do not 
authorise every grant (delegation of authority depends on 
the size of the grant), they do approve grant-making 
strategies in advance. Governance structures might 
explain the decision-making and priority-setting 
processes.
With information gathered from the annual reports 
and budgets, we created a database of disbursements 
classiﬁ ed by donor, type of disease, regional focus, type of 
investment, and type of receiving agency for 2005.The 
main health-ﬁ nancing goal of the four donors is the 
improvement of public health worldwide. Thus, we 
include funding for vaccines, clinical treatments, improve-
ments in water and sanitation, improved quality and 
quantity of roads, emergency relief, and public health 
advocacy in this paper. Although this method provides a 
valuable idea of global health ﬁ nancing, we recognise 
that assessment of 1 year, which oﬀ ers standardisation, 
does impose a constraint. The database is available on 
request from the corresponding author. 
We considered a total of 1006 grants or loans made by 
the World Bank (n=65), US Government (n=115), Global 
Fund (n=543), and BMGF (n=283). We independently 
classiﬁ ed these grants or loans according to type of 
disease based on key words used in their descriptions, 
and then conferred with each other to reach a consensus. 
For multipriority grants, we divided funding equally 
across the categories. To diﬀ erentiate research from 
services, we grouped all funds speciﬁ ed for exploratory 
purposes as research (including large-scale trials), and 
all those for the provision of health services as service. 
All donors had classiﬁ ed funding according to type of 
disease, with inconsistency between the donors. Thus, 
we established categories to show the primary targets of 
donor funding and placed each grant or loan in a 
category based on project descriptions and existing 
categories. 
For the US Government, we assessed commitments 
because of the absence of accessible data for dis-
bursements. For the other three institutions, we assessed 
the disbursements 
Comparison of the 2005 disbursements from the World 
Bank, BMGF, and Global Fund with commitments from 
the US Government in this analysis is problem atic 
because of the time delay between commitments and 
disbursements.10 The commitments reported are for 
funding during 1 year, which is the same as for the 
disbursements. In a study of 2005 US disburse-
ments for HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria—based on the 
credi tor reporting system database, legislation records, 
and interviews with US staﬀ —the total foreign pay-
outs (excluding the Global Fund contributions 
of $348·0 million) were reported to be $1·942 billion.19 
This amount is similar to the $2·0 billion estimated for 
commitments to HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria, and 
provides some validation for the comparison of the US 
data with that of other donors.
Panel: Stated priorities of worldwide health donors
World Bank
• Childhood mortality reduced (MDG 4, target 5, and 
MDG 7, target 10) 
• Childhood malnutrition improved (MDG 1, target 2) 
• Avoidable mortality and morbidity from chronic diseases 
and injuries reduced 
• Improved maternal, reproductive, and sexual health 
(MDG 5, target 6)
• Reduced morbidity and mortality from HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, and other priority pandemics 
(MDG 6, targets 7 and 8) 
• Improve ﬁ nancial protection (reduce the impoverishing 
eﬀ ects of illness for the poor or near poor) 
• Improve funding sustainability in the public sector from 
both domestic and external sources 
• Improved governance and transparency in the health 
sector (MDG 8, target 12)
US Government
• PEPFAR: HIV/AIDS
• President’s Malaria Initiative
• USAID: environment, health, family planning, health 
systems, HIV/AIDS, infectious disease, maternal and child 
health, nutrition
Gates Foundation
• Acute diarrhoeal disease 
• Acute lower respiratory infections 
• Child health
• HIV/AIDS
• Malaria
• Poor nutrition
• Reproductive and maternal health
• Tuberculosis
• Vaccine-preventable diseases 
• Other infectious diseases
Global Fund
• HIV/AIDS
• Tuberculosis
• Malaria
MDG=millennium development goal. PEPFAR=President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief. USAID=United States Agency for International Development.
For US Government 
commitment data see http://
www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/
cbj2005/
For Global Fund disbursements 
see http://www.theglobalfund.
org/en/ﬁ les/disbursements
indetail_raw.xls
For World Bank disbursements 
see http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/
0,,menuPK:115635~pagePK:
64020917~piP K:64021009~
theSitePK:40941,00.html
For BMGF commitments see 
http://www.gatesfoundation.
org/GlobalHealth/Grants/
default.htm?showYear=2005
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For each disease group, we included morbidity and 
mortality estimates in low-income and middle-income 
countries according to the global burden of disease 
project.3 This project, led by WHO, compiles estimates of 
incidence, prevalence, severity, and mortality for more 
than 100 causes, making use of a wide range of sources.20 
Of note, mortality data from the global burden of disease 
study are for 2001, whereas disbursements are for 2005. 
To estimate child mortality, we used all-cause mortality 
for age less than 5 years, including deaths due to vaccine-
preventable causes, and combined data for vaccine 
funding and child health. The justiﬁ cation for this 
grouping is that funding agencies specify child health as 
a target, rather than the treatment of speciﬁ c diseases. 
Further, age-speciﬁ c data are not fully available for 
individual diseases. Maternal morbidity and mortality 
include the burden of disability-adjusted life years and 
death related to conditions associated with poor maternal 
health and cervical cancer. The justiﬁ cation for this 
grouping of conditions associated with poor maternal 
health and cervical cancer is that they are combined for 
disbursements from donors. 
The categories presented here are not mutually 
exclusive—eg, a child death due to measles would be 
counted as child health (all-cause) and might be associated 
with undernutrition. Further, interactions between cate-
gories exist because many health interventions are 
mutually reinforcing. Improvement of the child’s 
nutritional status would reduce the risk of death from 
measles and so would a vaccination campaign. The 
mutually reinforcing nature of health interventions has 
been widely recognised, and has led many public-health 
experts to call for health-systems support and for packages 
of interventions, as in the disease control priorities 
project. We controlled for double counting of ﬁ nancial 
commitments by excluding disbursements made by one 
donor to another. Thus, US contributions to the Global 
Fund were excluded from the US Government data. 
Global health disbursements and donor 
priorities in ﬁ nancing
Surprisingly, little attention has been given to analysis of 
global health disbursements. Advocates for particular 
disease types or interventions often cite the abysmal 
funding for their disease, without the context of the 
overall global health funding allocations.
In 2005, the World Bank disbursed $3·8 billion through 
both the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, and the International Development 
Association for health (table 1; table 2). The main areas of 
investment—health systems, non-communicable disease 
and injury prevention, water and sanitation—are inte-
grated into general support loans to low-income and 
middle-income countries. The focus of the World Bank’s 
funding is on services for disease prevention, rather than 
research or treatment of disease (table 2). Loans for injury 
prevention are speciﬁ cally to improve road quality and 
quantity in countries. In 2005, 93·4% of the World Bank’s 
Disbursements (US$×10⁶) Deaths*×10⁶ DALYs*×10⁶ Total funding 
per death ($)
World Bank US Government Gates Foundation Global Fund
Child health (excluding vaccines) 140·4 (4%) 466·0 (13%) 14·4 (2%) 0 10·25 (21%) 132·2 60·5
General infectious diseases 159·9 (4%) 230 (7%) 76·9 (9%) 0 ·· ·· ··
Worldwide health strategy, 
partnerships, and general budget
0 96·1 (3%) 62·5 (8%) 0 ·· ·· ··
Health systems 1287·0 (34%) 0 0 8·2 (<1%) ·· ·· ··
HIV/AIDS 202·8 (5%) 1719·0 (49%) 119·3 (14%) 593·4 (56%) 2·56 (5%) 70·8 1029·1
Injury 705·1 (18%) 0 0 0 4·71 (10%) 155·9 149·7
Malaria 78·0 (2%) 156·6 (4%) 239·7 (29%) 308·2 (29%) 1·21 (3%) 39·9 646·7
Maternal health (including family 
planning)
187·2 (5%) 406·1†(12%) 29·6 (4%) 0 0·73 (2%) 26·4 853·28/295·9 
excluding family 
planning
Non-communicable diseases 83·5 (2%) 0 0 0 26·03‡ (54%) 678·8 3·2
Nutrition 74·1 (2%) 29·7 (<1%) 15·7 (2%) 0 5·89 (12%) 29·6 20·3
Polio 51·7 (1%) 127·3 (4%) 35·1 (4%) 0 0§ 0 >1×10⁶
Tuberculosis 3·9 (<1%) 124·0 (4%) 41·9 (5%) 146·1 (14%) 1·60 (3%) 35·9 197·8
Vaccines (excluding speciﬁ c 
disease areas above)
0 104·8 (3%) 191·4 (23%) 0 1·48 (3%) 43·2 200·1
Water and Sanitation 854·1 (22%) 0 0 0 1·78 (4) 58·7 479·8
Total 3827·7 3459·6 826·5 1055·9 n/a n/a n/a
Data are number (%), unless otherwise indicated. n/a=not applicable. *Data are for low-income and middle-income countries, and are taken from reference 3. †Entire 
amount for family planning. ‡Data are for all deaths due to child and maternal undernutrition as a risk factor, and are taken from reference 3. §No reported deaths due to 
polio in low-income and middle-income countries, and one death in high-income countries in 2001, according to reference 3.
Table 1: Disbursements, deaths, disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) according to type of disease
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total funding was disbursed directly through ﬁ nance or 
health ministries. The remaining 6·6% was given to 
state-owned enterprises (eg, Manila Water Company).
The US Government gave $3·5 billion through the 
United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) bureau for worldwide health, President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the 
President’s Malaria Initiative in 2005. It favoured vertical 
programmes to address HIV/AIDS and malaria (table 1). 
8% of all funding was for abstinence-only programmes.21 
Although complete information about the recipients of 
funding in developing countries is not available, the 
funds are shared with several partner organisations, 
which are a combination of civil-society organisations 
(eg, faith-based non-government organisations), the 
private sector, and government ministries.21 Although 
these organisations are publicly listed, a breakdown of 
how much funding reaches each organisation is not 
publicly available. 
In 2005, the BMGF disbursed about $826·5 million 
through 283 grants (table 1; table 2), mainly for vaccines 
and research done by organisations based in North 
America and western Europe. The foundation’s focus was 
on basic and clinical science research in infectious 
diseases. No grants were disbursed for non-communicable 
diseases and injuries, and one grant was for health-systems 
research. 76% of the BMGF’s disbursements were for 
prevention programmes and research. 
In 2005, the Global Fund disbursed $1·05 billion in 
543 payments (table 1; table 2). The investments in 
HIV/AIDS and malaria accounted for 56% and 29% of 
disbursements, whereas the investment in tuberculosis 
was 14%. The Global Fund does not directly fund research 
initiatives and 100% of disbursements were for services, 
though many grants included provisions for monitoring 
and assessing programmes. 
Comparisons of aggregate spending with mortality 
(ﬁ gure 1) and disability (ﬁ gure 2) data show the 
discrepancy between burden of disease in low-income 
and middle-income countries, and the focus of 
disease-speciﬁ c funding. When we assessed total 
disbursements from all four donors (ﬁ gure 2), three 
deviations in funding trends were noted: HIV/AIDS 
received more funding per death and disability-adjusted 
life years, whereas child health, and non-communicable 
disease and injury received less, than did other diseases. 
Assessment of global health ﬁ nancing
Our approach has several limitations. Although data for 
disbursements are available from the major health 
donors, they are of poor quality and are not standardised. 
Of equal importance, mortality data are incomplete for 
many of the funded specialties, leading to potentially 
imprecise assessments of disease burden. We do not 
suggest that mortality and disbursements should be 
perfectly correlated because the cost per year of life saved 
World Bank US Government BMGF Global Fund
Funding source IDA: members capital subscriptions; 
IBRD: private capital markets, members capital
US taxpayers Bill and Melinda Gates 
(private assets)
Donations from governments 
and private actors 
Accountable to Executive board Congress Co-chairs (Bill, Melinda, and 
William Gates)
Board
Leadership structure President, managing director, vice-president of 
human development
Executive branch (White House, 
State Department, USAID) 
Co-chairs, CEO, CFO, CCO, COO, 
CAO, managing director of public 
policy, general counsel, secretary, 
presidents for each Initiative 
(Global Health)
Executive Director, small 
Secretariat in Geneva
Funding type Loans (IBRD, IDA) Grants Grants Grants
Proportion of funding given to 
service and research
Research: 0·26%; service: 99·5%; both: 0·21% Research: ~5·0%, service: ~95·0% Research: 60·6%; service: 33·5%; 
both: 3·5%; n/a: 2·3%
Research: 0·0; service: 100·0%
Proportion of funding given to 
prevention and treatment
Prevention: 77·0%; treatment: 0·1%; 
both: 22·9%
Not speciﬁ ed, but for PEPFAR 
~30·0% for prevention and ~70·0% 
for treatment
Prevention: 75·5%; treatment: 
5·9%; both: 16·2%; n/a: 21·3%
Funding integrated; not 
speciﬁ ed
Region of recipient agency Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, 
Latin America, Caribbean, central Asia, Middle 
East, north Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa North America and western 
Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Primary recipients of funds Government Civil-society organisations, 
government
Private research, universities, civil 
society, public-private partnerships
Government/CCM
Financier has major ﬁ eld staﬀ  
presence
Yes Yes No No, in-country CCMs
2005 disbursement $3·8 billion $3·5 billion (commitment) $826·5 million $1·05 billion
Total endowment/commitment n/a $46·2 billion $67·0 billion* $10·4 billion
n/a=not applicable. BMGF=Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. IDA=International Development Association. IBRD=International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. USAID=United States Agency for 
International Development. CEO=chief executive oﬃ  cer. CFO=chief ﬁ nancial oﬃ  cer. CAO=chief administrative oﬃ  cer. CCO=chief communications oﬃ  cer. COO=chief operating oﬃ  cer. CCM=country coordinating 
mechanism. *Pending transfer of Warren Buﬀ et’s pledge to BMGF. 
Table 2: Key dimensions of the major worldwide health donors in 2005
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is not equal for all causes of mortality, with diﬀ erences in 
cost-eﬀ ectiveness of essential interventions.22 Additionally, 
other dimensions to resource allocation are equally, if not 
more, important, than disease burden, and thus decisions 
should not solely focus on this measure. Justiﬁ able, 
politically-guided deviations from even the best technical 
evidence in global health ﬁ nance might exist. Our 
assessment of institutional mandates, process of priority 
setting, and governance of the global health donors 
suggests that each has selected priorities based on 
perceived comparative advantage. In the World Bank’s 
new health, nutrition, and population strategy, the 
comparative advantage is in infrastructure (which 
explains the renewed focus on health systems);23 for the 
Global Fund, the comparative advantage is rapid delivery 
of funds (however, PEPFAR has done better according to 
this measure);24,25 and for BMGF, the comparative 
advantage is technology and innovation.26 Comparative 
disadvantages might aﬀ ect funding too. Multilateral 
institutions, because of their inclusion of low-income 
and middle-income countries in their governance 
structures and their interaction with government, might 
be better placed than bilateral donors to lead eﬀ orts to 
support a country in developing a health system. Delivery 
and development of drugs and health technology, which 
have been the focus of the bilateral (eg, US Government) 
and private (eg, BMGF) institutions, are less likely and 
less politically complex than is long-term investment in 
infrastructure. In our analysis, a perfect match of 
disbursements to mortality was considered the baseline, 
rather than the ideal, from which deviations should be 
explained. We did not do a political economic analysis, 
which would be an important step to understanding the 
decision-making processes of the major global health 
donors, and would most likely reinforce our recom-
mendation of continued attention to the development of 
country ownership, particularly planning and priority 
setting. 
Inadequate data for disbursements and disease 
burden
The task of tracking, then standardising, global health 
disbursements from the major donors is diﬃ  cult. A 
2 year project to track resources in global health, done by 
the Center for Global Development, showed substantial 
information gaps, including absence of credible data for 
commitments and funds available to global health, and a 
gap between the rhetoric of transparency and account-
ability, and the data systems to provide this informa-
tion.14 The report, like a previous report by the RAND 
corporation,13 makes recommendations to improve 
standard isation and access to data for global health 
funding. Three inter-related problems exist.
First, data for the global burden of disease are imperfect 
and incomplete. In our analysis, we used disability-
adjusted life years and mortality to consider the match 
between technical evidence and allocations. As noted for 
the burden of disease estimates, roughly two-thirds of 
deaths are not recorded.27 Thus estimates rely not only on 
death registration systems, but also on epidemiological 
estimates, cause of death models, and expert opinion, thus 
leading to margins of error in calculations of mortality.
The second problem is that the global health community 
does not have good estimates for non-disease-speciﬁ c 
deaths. For example, information is not available for 
mortality caused directly or indirectly by absence of 
access to health systems, and thus we are unable to 
consider health-system allocations on the same basis in 
which we consider those for HIV/AIDS. The insuﬃ  ciency 
of current health measures, particularly in determination 
of community (and national and regional) needs has 
been widely recognised. The launch of the BMGF-funded 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the 
University of Washington holds promise for further 
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progress on the assessment of health investments.28 Of 
note, the absence of methods for assessment not only 
aﬀ ects the ﬁ nancing of health-systems but also the 
ﬁ nancing of preventive public-health measures.29 This 
absence of a universally accepted measurement method 
leads to considerable uncertainty for researchers and 
donors making decisions about investment of their 
funds. With the present measurement system driven by 
disease-speciﬁ c causes of death, investment in health 
systems is seen as a bottomless pit because we do not 
have a universally accepted proxy for the eﬀ ect of 
health-systems investment on mortality. Once funds are 
labelled as health systems, tracking and measurement of 
their eﬀ ects become diﬃ  cult.
Third, public access to data for the disbursements 
made by the major global health donors varies—eg, the 
Global Fund and the World Bank have made all their data 
publicly available, whereas the US Government and the 
BMGF have not. The Center for Public Integrity has 
documented the diﬃ  culty in accessing information about 
US Government disbursements for PEPFAR. It gained 
access to two grant databases by suing the US State 
Department, and reported many inconsistencies in 
reporting of disbursements. For example, the “Center 
found more than 100 instances in which the total amount 
awarded to sub-partners was listed as being greater than 
the total amount received by their prime partners”.30 
Across the donors, the absence of standardisation in the 
organisation of funding data makes any analysis of global 
health funding diﬃ  cult. 
On the basis of this research, we suggest that all health 
donors provide data in a standardised format, which 
should include the date and amount (in US$) of the 
ﬁ nancial commitments and disbursements, the 
organisation to receive the funding, the purpose and 
function of the funding, and a notice of any irregularities, 
including withdrawal or reduction in the funding. These 
data could be similar to those provided by the OECD 
creditor reporting system but would need to build on 
this system to include the BMGF, provide further 
information about grants (such as what exactly the funds 
were given for within health and to whom), and to ensure 
that the information provided is consistent across the 
donors.12 The data could be managed through the OECD 
system or perhaps overseen by the new Institute for 
Health Metrics and Evaluation. Such standardisation 
and transparency could help facilitate the development 
of country input into health ﬁ nancing by reduction of 
the uncertainties and confusion about ﬁ nancing that 
have often stiﬂ ed this input.
Development of country ownership in health
All four donors do not explicitly incorporate the demands 
of the governments or citizens of the developing country, 
or articulate the concept of ownership in setting the 
priorities but instead choose their priorities on the basis 
of what each organisation deﬁ nes as important. Even 
those who point to the inclusive board of the Global Fund 
or its country-coordinating mechanism must acknowledge 
that the priorities of the Global Fund, namely HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria, were included in the 
organisation’s mandate.
In non-health sector aid, after many years of debate, the 
importance of ownership has been recognised, as shown 
by the endorsement of the 2005 Paris Declaration. 
Ownership was deﬁ ned in the declaration as developing 
countries exercising “eﬀ ective leadership over their 
development policies, and strategies” and coordinating 
development actions.31 Small steps are being taken in this 
direction in global health but they should be examined 
critically. For example, the International Health Partnership 
launched in 2007 by eight donor countries and 11 donor 
agencies aims to provide better coordination among 
donors; focus on improvement of health systems as a 
whole; and develop and support countries’ own health 
plans.32 Yet, the concerns are that coordination will reduce 
the participation of developing countries in policy making 
by shifting the balance of power towards the “consortium 
of donors acting in unison” and thus could result  in an 
inherent contradiction in the partnership.33 The 
International Health Partnership might be seen to create 
new strings without providing additional sources of funds 
to developing countries. Although the rhetoric is in place 
and the principles are outlined in the Paris Declaration, 
action lags far behind. Rather than countries taking 
ownership so that investment can be made in long-term 
priority setting and planning, donors focus on quick results 
and measurable returns through vertical programming. 
The focus on these quick results discourages investment 
in health systems and indicates the need for a country-led 
process of priority setting.
A high-level working group for setting a developing 
country agenda for global health reported widespread 
views that the inclination of donors to repeatedly create 
new initiatives, like the parallel priorities and delivery of 
care by donors, weakens national strategies.16 This diﬃ  culty 
was exacerbated by the absence of transparency among 
donors, and restricted awareness by health ministries 
about what donors were directing funds to. As one minister 
said about donors, “they like to monitor activities, but they 
do not like to be monitored and evaluated”.16
The global health community should now move towards 
incorporating the concept of ownership into health 
assistance and realising the principles of the Paris 
Declaration. Without systematic attention to the articulated 
needs of developing countries through consultation and 
real partnership, donors for global health will not achieve 
informed and inclusive decision making. 
Toward more equitable global health ﬁ nancing
The billion-dollar health institutions vary in their 
distribution of funding by geographic focus, investment 
in service or research, and support of government or civil 
society and private groups. Global health governance can 
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be viewed as a patchwork of donors, UN agencies, 
governments, civil-society organisations, and the private 
sector.34 In this paper, we have analysed the investments 
of the major global health donors—ie, the World Bank, 
US Government, BMGF, and Global Fund. The pluralism 
of global health institutions and the informal alliances 
on which power in global health rests make a uniﬁ ed and 
fully coordinated health system highly unlikely.34,35 Our 
analysis shows ﬁ rst, a clear part to be played by donors in 
improvement of the information gap through reporting 
of their funding in a complete, standardised manner, 
fully accessible to the public, and adequately 
communicated to the governments of developing 
countries; and second, the need to move towards decision 
making based on the articulated needs of the developing 
countries in a manner consistent with the Paris 
Declaration.
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